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Abstract
Attitudes towardsmigrants and refugees are created and reflected at the level of public policies, aswell as in local communi‐
ties which cultivate traditional approaches and a specific worldview. The refugee crisis in Europe in the mid‐2010s showed
how public opinion translated into voting behaviour and became a source of strength for nationalist anti‐immigrant move‐
ments and parties across the continent. East‐Central Europe was no exception, regardless of the absence of a long‐term,
massive inflow of refugees. Nevertheless, the migration crisis created a new political narrative which exploited deeply
rooted resentments, complexes, and fears. This article aims to analyse the official policy responses to the refugee crisis in
the four East‐Central European countries: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, which together constitute
the so‐called Visegrad Four. It puts the emphasis on the discriminatory practice of misnaming the refugees, which became
deeply anchored in the political discourse of these countries. Based on a qualitative content analysis supplemented by the
findings of public opinion polls, the argument developed in the article is that reluctant and defensive attitudes towards
the refugees have been determined by the revival of parochialism as a radical reaction to the challenges of global trends
and supra‐local processes. The theoretical framing of the refugee problem is built on politicization, in connection with
the concept of parochialism, seen from political and social perspectives, and the meaning of the use of the misnomer as
a policy instrument. The article concludes that the migration crisis petrified traditional cleavages at the supra‐local level,
reinforcing simultaneously the sense of parochial altruism and hostility towards “the other.”
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1. Introduction
The refugee crisis in Europe has fuelled nationalist and
xenophobic attitudes among citizens of the European
Union. “The politics of phobias” (Taras, 2009, pp. 83–86;
cf. Bauman, 2004, p. 99) unwrapped the dynamics of eth‐
nocentric and discriminatory campaigns against immi‐
grants. It emboldened right‐wing populist parties to
unleash a new wave of xenophobic mobilisation against
“the enemy fromabroad” (Pelinka, 2013, p. 9) by creating
fear of the consequences of immigration (Wodak, 2015).
Public opinion translated into voting behaviour and polit‐
ical decisions became a source of strength for national‐
ist anti‐immigrantmovements and parties across Europe.
East‐Central Europe is no exception, although the region
has not experienced a long‐term,massive inflow of these
refugees thus far. However, the issue of immigrants com‐
ing to Europe from the Middle East and Africa has left a
deepmark onpolitical discourse and for nowhas brought
about specific political consequences. A newpolitical nar‐
rative has exploited deeply rooted resentments, com‐
plexes, and fears, which has led to the politicisation
and securitisation of the migration and refugee issues.
East‐Central Europe is one of the arenas of the public
discourse on immigration and the international protec‐
tion of refugees. The political arena has been stigmatized
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by ethno‐nationalist narratives, projected onto societies
by governments and some nationalist and populist polit‐
ical parties.
This article aims to analyse and explain the radi‐
cal policy response to the Europe‐wide refugee crisis
in East‐Central Europe in the mid‐2010s. The growing
resentment against immigrants accompanied the excep‐
tional inflow of “strangers” from Asian and African coun‐
tries. Regardless of the unprecedented scale of themigra‐
tion crisis, popular preferences for fending off foreigners
and preserving national integrity were nothing unusual;
they hadoccurredon various occasions in Europeprior to
the developments of the mid‐2010s. Ethnocentric, xeno‐
phobic and racist attitudes have been intensified in times
of emergency caused by internal cleavages, integration
challenges, and external pressures (De Master & Le Roy,
2000; Gibson, 2002; Hargreaves & Leaman, 1995; Levy,
2010; Van der Brug et al., 2000; Wistrich, 1999).
Against that background, the case of the four East‐
Central European countries—Poland, Hungary, Slovakia,
and the Czech Republic, which together constitute the
so‐called Visegrad Four (or the Visegrad Group)—is
taken up for three reasons. Firstly, the governments of
the Visegrad Four adopted an uncompromising stance
against refugees and coordinated their policies on the
regional level. Secondly, they deliberately disavowed the
rights of refugees by considering them a sub‐category of
voluntarymigrants. Accordingly, they expunged the term
“refugee” from the official discourse ofmigration. Thirdly,
the semantic eradication of refugees was a deliberate
ploy for deflecting criticism of intolerance towards exiles
and the de‐legitimisation of asylum seekers.
The article puts the emphasis on the discrimina‐
tory practice of misnaming the refugees, which became
deeply anchored in the political discourse of the four
East‐Central European countries. While the method of
applying alternative terms for refugees to the public dis‐
course has usually accompanied refugee crises (see Bello,
2017, pp. 55–59; Long, 2013; Zetter, 1991, 2007), the
Visegrad Four’s enduring and reckless disregard for the
ontological status of refugees has been exceptional, espe‐
cially in comparison with the other EU member states.
The latter highlighted the issue of refugees and the EU’s
asylum policy during the migration crisis by pointing to
its legal, political, institutional, and financial determi‐
nants. The very term “refugee” was present in many vari‐
eties in official documents adopted by the EU institu‐
tions and issued by national governments of themember
states (Menéndez, 2016, pp. 395–407; Morsut & Kruke,
2018, pp. 149–155; Niemann& Zaun, 2018; Sigona, 2018,
pp. 457–458)—except for the Visegrad Four.
The aversion to refugees underpinning that practice
should be interpreted as a behavioural trait of parochial
politicians in East‐Central Europe. Consequently, paro‐
chialism is considered as a post‐Communist anti‐
modernisation backlash against the consequences of
globalisation and cosmopolitanism (cf. Malešević, 2004,
pp. 115–117).
The adopted time frame encompasses the climax of
refugee inflow to European countries in 2015 and subse‐
quent developments lasting to the evident subsiding of
the migratory wave in 2017.
The conceptual framing of the refugee problem
in connection with parochialism has been built on
politicisation, conceived as the making of a matter a
subject of public dispute within the political system
(see De Wilde, 2011; De Wilde & Zürn, 2012, p. 139;
Grande & Hutter, 2016, pp. 7–8). In East‐Central Europe
the issue of refugees was politicised by the govern‐
ments through discursive shifts towards discriminatory
opinions about refugees and immigrants (Krzyżanowski,
2017; Krzyżanowski et al., 2018, pp. 4–6). The contours
of political ethnography (Kubik, 2009; Schatz, 2009) can
be noticed wherever particularism, localism, familism,
in‐group homogeneity and exclusionary practices are
highlighted. In that context, the concept of parochial
altruism is applied to capture the “we” versus “them”
divide (see Leudar et al., 2004, 2008) as a combina‐
tion of social solidarity and cooperative engagement
with discriminatory tendencies and hostility towards
other groups. Parochial altruism as a motivational fac‐
tor behind conflicting identities and political cleavages
is confronted with regional integration processes in
Europe. Internal divisions in the EU, which facilitated
ethnopolitical mobilization and populism, contributed
to the perception of parochialism as “false uniqueness”
(Buhari‐Gulmez & Gulmez, 2020). Accordingly, parochial
Europe was conceptualised as a single and exceptional
polity that inspires instrumental loyalties, and rewards
provincial actors for their dedication and engagement
in local affairs. The hypothetical assumption that the
rejection of refugees by parochial actors, motivated by
the exclusionary and confrontational nature of parochial
altruism, is strengthened by the application of the con‐
cept of the misnomer. Based on Sartori (1991), Rancière
(1992, 1999), and Hadland (2002), a misnomer is inter‐
preted as a premeditated political tool for the denial of a
true identity to the individual. Hence, the misnaming of
refugees serves to strip them of their political, legal, and
human rights.
Concerning the method, this study employs an inter‐
pretive political analysis approach (Schwartz‐Shea &
Yanow, 2012; Yanow, 2000) to the study of public dis‐
course. It is based on a qualitative content analysis of
64 texts (transcripts), embracing public speeches, offi‐
cial statements, and joint declarations adopted in the
years 2015–2017. The samples were carefully selected
according to their substance (reference to migration
and refugee matters), political status (top‐level politi‐
cians) and impact on public opinion (approval rat‐
ings). Selected documents adopted by the Visegrad
Group were included in the text corpus. “Refugee” was
determined to be the keyword; synonyms and related
words (“migrant,” “immigrant,” “asylum seeker”, and
their derivatives) served as referential terms. Transcripts
were tagged manually. The examination of the texts
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was focused on the contextual absence of the key‐
word and its relational analysis (Krippendorff, 2003,
pp. 66–68). The most illustrative examples of the anti‐
refugee discourse were interpreted within the frame‐
work of parochial politics. The findings of the content
analysis were supplemented by data from public opin‐
ion polls.
The argument developed in the article is that reluc‐
tant and defensive attitudes towards the refugees in the
Visegrad countries have been determined by the revival
of parochialism as a radical reaction to the challenges
of cultural modernisation in post‐Communist societies.
The argument holds that the politicisation of the topic
of refugees in official discourse caused a discriminatory
practice of misnaming them and denigrating them as
public foes.
The article proceeds as follows. First, it presents
the conceptualisation of parochialism in the contexts
of political, sociological, and European integration stud‐
ies. It explains the meaning of parochial altruism and
interprets it against the backdrop of European integra‐
tion. It then introduces the term “misnomer,” clarifying
its semantic content and utility for the interpretation of
parochial politics. The next section explains the use of the
term “refugee” as a misnomer by top political decision‐
makers in the Visegrad countries for the management
of the refugee crisis in the mid‐2010s. This is followed
by another case of the misnaming of refugees based on
ethno‐cultural and religious factors: The figure of the
“Arab” as equivalent to a refugee is interpreted with ref‐
erence to political discourse and public opinion polls.
2. Parochial Politics and the Role of Misnomers
Parochialism is commonly seen as an anachronistic rem‐
nant of the past, an anti‐modernist posture character‐
ized by a narrowness of views, keen interest in local
affairs, petty provincialism, and the lack of a global per‐
spective (Parochialism, 2005). Rephrasing the environ‐
mental slogan, parochialism recommends that we “think
locally, act locally.” Parochialism is conceived as an indi‐
vidual or group attitude towards social reality which
structures collective behaviour around local, indigenous,
and inner‐circle affairs. It is associated in the social sci‐
ences with a tendency to focus on issues that are being
debated within a given group, a community, or a soci‐
ety (Poulson & Campbell, 2010, p. 32). From a politi‐
cal culture perspective, parochialism is marked by a pas‐
sive attitude towards the political system, the diffusion
of roles along political, economic, and religious orien‐
tations, and a focus on autonomous local communities
(Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 17). From a social network
perspective, parochialism, as Bowles and Gintis (2004,
p. 18) argue, “makes networks not only smaller, but
more homogeneous as well, corresponding efficiency‐
enhancing effects of similarity or social affinity with
parochial networks may be important.” However, in‐
group relative homogeneity determines ways of belong‐
ing and fosters exclusionary practices. As De Dreu et al.
(2014, p. 4) put it, “parochial cooperation is motivated
by, and manifested in (1) protecting and promoting the
in‐group (henceforth in‐group love), and (2) derogating
and fighting more or less rivalling out‐groups (hence‐
forth out‐group hate).” Due to that, parochial behaviour
is identified with particularism, localism, familism, and
un‐civic loyalties. It endorses sentiments and practices
underpinning archaic social distinctions and intolerance
of strangers (Bowles & Gintis, 2004, p. 3). Concurrently,
parochialism prefers in‐group homogeneity and reduces
the pool of potential outsiders that can migrate into
the network (Bowles & Gintis, 2004, p. 9; Poulson &
Campbell, 2010). Thus, social exclusion is inscribed in the
group logic of parochialism and reduces tolerance and
the diversity of interactions within a given group, as well
as with external actors.
Parochialism stands in a stark opposition to a cos‐
mopolitan perspective. Parochial life is situated on the
grass‐roots level. It addresses local actors (autonomous
local authorities, religious leaders, grassroots activists)
and, if necessary, local representatives of central author‐
ities or nation‐wide political parties and social move‐
ments (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 168; Tilly, 1986,
pp. 391–392). Bowles and Gintis (2004) argue that
parochialism, as an endogenously determined network
of interactions, increases specific problem‐solving capac‐
ities. Specifically, parochialism arouses altruistic senti‐
ments within a community or social group bound by kin‐
ship, ethnicity, race, cultural affinity, or national identity.
In‐group altruism promotes mutual trust and reduces
communication difficulties. The intersection of parochial‐
ism and altruism, aptly conceptualised by Choi and
Bowles (2007, pp. 636–640), addresses the social solidar‐
ity and group benefits resulting from hostility towards
other groups. Parochial altruism is based on a combina‐
tion of in‐group tendencies to discriminate and cooper‐
atively engage in violent aggression against out‐group
members (De Dreu et al., 2015; Rusch, 2014). Parochial
altruists “give preferentially to their own members and
punish those who harm group members more severely
than if the victim is not an insider” (Choi & Bowles, 2007,
p. 638). Parochial behaviour, consisting in preferences
for favouring the members of one’s own social group,
is altruistically internalized through egalitarian norm tak‐
ing and expressed by a determination to enter conflict
with norm‐breakers and punish them for disobedience
(Bernhard et al., 2006, p. 912).
The “we” versus “them” divide, emphasised in
the classical studies on parochial altruism, has been
analysed from a more nuanced angle with regard to
conflicting identities and complex diversities. Kustov
has recently proven that parochial altruism is what
gives motivational power to conflicting identities and
triggers important political cleavages (Kustov, 2020).
Buhari‐Gulmez et al. (2020) make a reference to inter‐
nal divisions and divergent directions in the case of
European integration. They put forward a four‐fold
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taxonomy of Europe’s multiple transformation paths
(“many Europes”). “Parochial” Europe, which is “unmak‐
ing European integration and transforming Europe along
(micro)nationalist lines” is one of the four facets of the
transformation of contemporary European politics and
society. Parochial Europe is nested in the conventional
nation‐state model which advocates the pre‐eminence
of national sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction and state
borders. Vertical dependencies are essentially unwel‐
come and contested. Supranational powers and mech‐
anisms are denounced as hegemonic, elitist, and even
detrimental. State authorities at the central level are
criticized for excessive fiscalism, cumbersome bureau‐
cracy, and disregard for local affairs. Sometimes, in the
context of EU politics, they are blamed for approv‐
ing the “Brussels’ dictatorship” and neglecting “gen‐
uine” national interests: “Rather than a civilizationist
discourse for Europe‐wide harmony, Parochial Europe
resorts to nationalist, populist and divisive rhetoric seek‐
ing nation‐wide harmony without European interfer‐
ence” (Buhari‐Gulmez & Gulmez, 2020, p. 7).
Buhari‐Gulmez and Gulmez (2020, p. 9) argue
that nationalist discourse and critical attitudes towards
supranational integration, which characterize parochial‐
ism, should not be identified completely with anti‐
Europeanism or hard Euroscepticism. They are often
more nuanced, based on selectivity or the relativisa‐
tion of integrationist policies and mechanisms. They
stem from rationalized, nation‐centred, even egoistic
prerequisites, such as economic interest, political influ‐
ence, or religious imperatives. Hence, parochial Europe
inspires instrumental loyalties which reward provincial
actors for their care for local resources by means of
a specific “parochial entrepreneurship.” Practical goals,
usually political and economic ones, are often pursued
under the cover of the outspoken contestation of supra‐
nationalist and cosmopolitan ideas with the use of a spe‐
cific discourse.
The linguistic factor is relevant for in‐group inter‐
actions and inter‐group communication. The language
of messages circulated within a local community seeks
to augment the group identity and value orientation.
It may tend to emphasise exclusive contents and favour
a specific vernacular. As to the latter, Leigh (2000)
warns that the received meaning of the messages
expressed through or embedded in various parochial
behaviours may sometimes be found offensive by exter‐
nal audiences. Terminology is among the key tenets
of Sartori’s conceptualisation of parochialism. He con‐
ceived parochialism as “single‐country studies in vacuo,
that purely and simply ignore the categories established
by general theories and/or by comparative frameworks
of analyses, and thereby unceasingly invent, on the
spur of the moment, an ad hoc, self‐tailored terminol‐
ogy” (Sartori, 1991, p. 247). The argument concern‐
ing the total neglect of categories established by gen‐
eral theories and comparative frameworks is particu‐
larly strong in the context of the discursive and descrip‐
tive features of parochial communication. Sartori (1991,
p. 248) notes that parochialism causes mislabelling and
accepts misnomers.
The word “misnomer” refers to a name or term that
is wrong or inappropriate for the thing or person it
describes. It comes from the Old French mesnommer,
which meant “to name wrongly.” According toWebster’s
New World Dictionary of the American Language, the
noun misnomer refers to: “1. a) the act of applying a
wrong name or epithet to some person or thing b) such a
name or epithet 2. an error in naming a person or place
in a legal document” (Guralnik, 1986, p. 909).
The use of a misnomer may presumably be regarded
as amistake, although it should not be used as a synonym
for this. It applies to a specific kind ofmistake, that which
results from a misunderstanding, poor knowledge, false
analogy, or bad intentions. Hence, it can be either acci‐
dental or, more often, premeditated.
In parochial discourse, misnomers are used to sim‐
plify and even vulgarize complex diversities and multi‐
dimensional processes, particularly in the realm of
politics. Hadland (2002, p. 41) claims that “misnomers
play a central role in the battle for vocabulary in political
speech.”Misnomers often serve to consolidate the public
around catchy words, “headlines” which offer a straight‐
forward and immediate explanation of topical problems.
Rancière (1992) holds that misnomers are policy
instruments used to deny a true identity to an individual.
He writes: “Politics is about ‘wrong’ names―misnomers
that articulate a gap and connect with a wrong”
(Rancière, 1992, p. 62). Misnomers are intended to pro‐
duce subjectivization (subjectification) by forming one’s
identity in relation to others’ identities (Rancière, 1999,
pp. 35–36). Rancière illustrated this practice with refer‐
ence to immigrants in France in the 1960s. The cate‐
gory “immigrant” was transformed over time and—due
to racist and xenophobic tendencies, as well as to prob‐
lems raised by the immigrant population—got a new con‐
notation, identified with feelings of fear and rejection
(Rancière, 1992, p. 63). Recently that practice was noted
by Stierl (2019, pp. 43–44) in the context of the migrant
crisis in Europe.
In parochial politics misnomers serve a dual role:
They enhance populist “othering” (Benveniste et al.,
2017, pp. 54–61) in public discourse and consolidate the
indigenous population around the exclusionary discur‐
sive practice of making refugees “disappear” (Chandler,
2013, pp. 39, 45–46; Macklin, 2005). The latter role
entails an active engagement of predominant actors
(political leaders, government officials, state‐controlled
media tycoons) in the erasure of the refugees from offi‐
cial discourse.
3. Post‐2015 Anti‐Migration Discourses in the Visegrad
Four: Misnaming the Refugee
The slow yet constant decline of socialist and liberal
parties in the 2010s in the four East‐Central European
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countries opened a space for conservative, nationalist
and populist forces, which either won popular support
sufficient to form a government or mobilised a consid‐
erable proportion of the citizenry around a nationalist
or populist discourse, exerting therefore intense pres‐
sure on the ruling parties and framing domestic poli‐
tics in an ethnopolitical context (Agh, 2015; Bauerova,
2018; Czarnecka, 2018; Koß&Séville, 2020). Even though
migration policies have accompanied the social and eco‐
nomic development of the four Visegrad countries in
recent decades, they have been revised and modified by
the nationalist‐populist governments which took power
in the 2010s (Bugaric & Kuhelj, 2018; Havlík, 2019;
Sadurski, 2019; Vachudova, 2019). The concept of “illib‐
eral” democracy, propagated by the Hungarian Prime
Minister Viktor Orbán, added impetus to the populist
and nationalist discourse, and enabled the emergence
of migration issues in the national and security con‐
texts (Buzogány & Varga, 2018; Halmai, 2019; Lorenz &
Anders, 2021).
The surge of immigration and massive inflow of
refugees into Europe in 2015 greatly contributed to the
display of the migration question as a political priority
and as a security issue. Even though the Visegrad Four
did not absorb a significant number of refugees, with the
exception of Hungary in 2015, it being an EU “frontline”
state perceived as a corridor to the rich countries of the
western part of Europe (mostly Germany and Sweden),
the panic over the wave of migrants and refugees hit the
Visegrad Four as well.
The open attitude towards refugees presented by
many EU member states (with Germany practicing
Wilkommenskultur at the forefront) contrasted sharply
with the asylumpolicies of the Visegrad Four, whichwere
based on a restrictive approach and a relatively low level
of approval measured by the number of positive deci‐
sions on asylum applications (Klaus, 2017; Krastev, 2017).
The terrorist assault on the Charlie Hebdo newspa‐
per office in Paris in January 2015 triggered defensive
and exclusionary reactions throughout the East‐Central
European countries. Fear and anxiety were channelled
into mobilisation against immigrants and Muslims—two
categories identified with the perpetrators of the terror‐
ist attack. Immediately after the Charlie Hebdo shoot‐
ing, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared that Hungary
would not accept any migrants (“Orbán villás nyelven,”
2015). He said: “The best immigrant is one who does
not come here at all” (Orbán, 2016). Consequently,
the Hungarian government adopted a hawkish posture
towards immigrants in Europe (Glied, 2020, p. 38). That
anti‐migrant rhetoric was fuelled by the surge of the
migration crisis in mid‐2015 and a massive influx of
refugees into Hungary.
The arrival of nationals from Muslim countries the
Middle East and South Asia, and their immediate claim
for the status of international refugee, alarmed the
Hungarian authorities and awakened nationalist parties
in the other Visegrad Four. International obligations
derived from the Geneva Convention on Refugees and
enshrined in European law (European Convention on
Human Rights, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU asy‐
lum system) required that the national authorities com‐
ply with international standards of protection for asylum
seekers. In addition, these arrangements set the min‐
imum standard of treatment of refugees, determined
their juridical status, and, most importantly, opened up
the possibility of applicants remaining in a given terri‐
tory either permanently or until an alternative solution
is found. Lastly, international legal standards make gov‐
ernments guarantee the right to effectively claim inter‐
national protection without obstructions or undue delay.
Accordingly, Orbán did not hesitate to declare that “we
pursue a migration policy which of course grants polit‐
ical refugees all the possibilities afforded by interna‐
tional law, but which does not allow anyone else in”
(Orbán, 2016).
Therefore, denying people the ontological status of
refugee was the simplest way of containing the incoming
asylum seekers and stripping them of the right to inter‐
national protection. This was made by a discursive shift
in official migration discourse using the word “refugee”
as a misnomer. Consequently, a widespread tendency to
replace it with other synonymous or euphemistic terms
led to a recontextualization of the discourse onmigration
along the lines of the political imperatives derived from
the dominant nationalist and populist rhetoric of the rul‐
ing party.
Despite over 177,000 applications for refugee status
were submitted to the Hungarian authorities throughout
2015, the Hungarian government insisted on labelling
refugees as “economic migrants” (megélhetési beván‐
dorlók) and emphasized the burden they placed on the
Hungarian state and economy (Uitz, 2020, p. 17). Viktor
Orbán denied, on many occasions, the existence of a
serious humanitarian and legal issue of international
refugees. He announced that “we are not witnessing
the arrival of refugees, but a Europe being threatened
by mass migration” (“PM Orbán asks,” 2016). He added:
“This is not a refugee crisis. This is amassmigratorymove‐
ment composed of economic migrants, refugees, asylum
seekers and also foreign fighters. This is an uncontrolled
and unregulated process” (UN, 2015). He even suggested
that the figure of the refugee is a form of disguise, hiding
an individual’s real nature, displaying those external fea‐
tures and behavioural traitswhich present themigrant as
if he or she were a refugee. In the national consultation
letter on immigration and terrorism, issued in May 2015,
Orbán emphasized the following: “Economic immigrants
cross the borders illegally, and while they act as refugees,
they come for social benefits and work opportunities”
(Orbán as cited in Marton, 2017, p. 35).
The locution “economic migrant” was made
widespread in the official language of the Visegrad Four
governments, as well as at the level of the Visegrad
Group. The prime ministers of the Visegrad Four, in
a joint statement on migration adopted in July 2017,
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declared that “we believe that the precondition to any
efficient strategy related to mixed migratory flows is to
distinguish between genuine asylum seekers and eco‐
nomic migrants” (V4 Connects, 2017). That position was
confirmed in a letter from the Prime Ministers of the
Visegrad Four to Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni
of 19 July 2017 addressing the pressure that migra‐
tion was causing; the heads of the Visegrad Four gov‐
ernments stated that “the vast majority of the mixed
migration flows are composed of economic migrants”
(Visegrad Group, 2017). It is significant that the docu‐
ments adopted by the Visegrad Group about refugees
and migration since the outbreak of the crisis in Europe
have never contained the very term ‘ ”refugee,” substi‐
tuting it—if required—with “asylum seeker” or, inciden‐
tally, “people who satisfy asylum criteria” and “those in
genuine need of international protection.”
The narrative based on misnaming the refugee
and replacing him or her with an “economic migrant”
went viral among top government officials in the
Visegrad Four. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico ascer‐
tained in late 2015 that “ninety‐five percent of those
arriving in Slovakia were economic migrants and not
refugees” (Stepper, 2016, p. 66). A similar differentiation
between refugees (uprchlíky) and migrants (migranty)
was adopted by the Czech government led by Prime
Minister Andrej Babiš (Hampejs, 2018; Jelínková, 2019).
Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz, representing the lib‐
eral Civic Platform government which was replaced in
November 2015 by Law and Justice (PiS), expressed the
reservation, in the context of EU plans for a refugee
relocation system, that Poland was committed to host
“as many refugees, but not economic migrants, as we
can handle” (Potyrała, 2016, p. 80). During a parliamen‐
tary debate on the migration crisis in Europe, Jarosław
Kaczyński, the leader of the PiS, said “it is necessary to
clearly distinguish between refugees, who are actually
fleeing the war, and economic emigrants. It is necessary
to differentiate between them” (Kaczyński, 2015).
Marton (2017, pp. 38–39) aptly captures the semiotic
context of the migration‐related key words. He clarifies
this in the following terms:
Using the expression “economic immigrant” instantly
gives away the intentions of the government on how
they want Hungarians to see refugees: People who
come for economic purposes, putting in danger the
workplace and wellbeing of Hungarians. Even ‘immi‐
grant’ (migráns in Hungarian) as a choice of word
evokes mistrust, as ‘immigrant’ is a foreign word in
Hungarian, unfamiliar and not widely used, therefore
it serves the purpose of alienation and negative con‐
notation towards the subject of the word. In oppo‐
sition, “refugee” (menekült in Hungarian) is a more
familiar word for Hungarian citizens and channels a
positive connotation (a person who is running away
from something and needs some sort of an aid).
4. An Ethno‐Nationalistic Misnomer: Denigrating
“Arabs”
Religious and cultural factors have been yet another
trait of parochial politics in the Visegrad Four. Antipathy
towards “others” (“strangers,” “aliens”) was extended to
the migration conundrum throughout Europe. The high‐
lighting of national values, cultivating local traditions and
“closing ranks,” reactions typical for parochial altruism,
have reflected hypersensitivities to migrants’ customs
and behaviours. Prospects for hosting large groups of
refugees and granting them official protection and assis‐
tancewere damaged by the governments of the Visegrad
Four with growing acceptance from their nationals
(Pachocka, 2016). The goodness of “welcome politics”
and generosity towards refugees were conceived as
erroneous and unfounded, evidencing political myopia
(Pacek, 2020, pp. 95–96).
Factual or alleged cases of wrongdoing and offenses
committed by immigrants were interpreted as: (1) disre‐
gard for hospitality and assistance provided by the host‐
ing states; (2) the lack of adaptability to local conditions
due to cultural, religious and language differences; and
(3) a sense of “impunity” due to lengthy procedures,
ineffective mechanisms for returning unsuccessful appli‐
cants and a relatively wide scope of tolerance to irregu‐
lar migrants. Therefore, the religious and ethnic distinc‐
tiveness of others was contrasted with parochial virtues
and the goodness of “NIMBY‐ism”–“Not InMy Back Yard”
(Hunter & Hutchinson, 1994, p. 1164).
The prevalence of nationals of Syria, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan in the huge wave of refugees that reached
Europe in the mid‐2010s made the migration prob‐
lem commonly identified with massive flow of Muslims
(“Arabs”). The xenophobic narrative constructed by
ethno‐nationalistic actors in the Visegrad Four portrayed
refugees as barbarians who flood the European coun‐
tries, undermine the public order, and abuse their
right to international humanitarian assistance (Kalmar,
2018; Kende & Krekó, 2020; Pickel & Öztürk, 2018).
Viktor Orbán, in an interview for the German daily Bild
(Blome & Stenzel, 2018), said: “We don’t see these
people as Muslim refugees. We see them as Muslim
invaders….We believe that a large number of Muslims
inevitably lead to parallel societies, because Christian
and Muslim society will never unite.” In addition, he
argued against the reception of Muslimmigrants: “If you
take masses of non‐registered immigrants from the
Middle East into your country, you are importing terror‐
ism, crime, anti‐Semitism, and homophobia,” he said in
the interview (Blome & Stenzel, 2018). In a similar mood
Robert Fico, the leader of the then‐ruling Smer‐SD in
Slovakia, asserted that the multiculturalism project had
failed, and that Slovakia was reluctant to see the arrival
of large numbers of Muslims, the erection of mosques,
and changes in the culture of the country (Nyzio, 2017,
p. 51). The Slovak prime minister claimed that migrants
coming from the Middle East posed a serious threat to
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his country. He bluntly said that “it may look strange
but sorry….Islam has no place in Slovakia” (Chadwick,
2016). He declared firmly that his government “will never
make a voluntary decision that would lead to forma‐
tion of a unifiedMuslim community in Slovakia” (Reuters
Staff, 2016).
Czech President Miloš Zeman warned Europe of an
“organised invasion” of migrants and advised young men
coming from the Middle East to take up arms and fight
against the Islamic State instead of heading for Europe to
seek asylum (“Czech president,” 2015). He also said that
the migration wave in Europe in 2015 was made up of
Islamists. He added: “We should make sure that they will
not evenbe able to enter our territory” (“Czech President
Miloš Zeman”, 2015). Petr Fiala, the leader of the right‐of‐
centre Civic Democratic Party (ODS), assured Czech citi‐
zens that “radical Islam is a threat. Uncontrolled masses
of refugees do constitute a security threat” (“Prior to
Angela Merkel’s,” 2016). In a similar vein, another influ‐
ential Czech politician, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš,
was said, prior to the election of 2016, to have taken
“a sharply defined stance against continuing immigra‐
tion… and against the potential formation of a large
Muslim community in the Czech Republic” (Klima, 2016).
The popular dislike to Muslims among the ruling
politicians correlated with the attitudes of the pub‐
lic opinion towards the migration crisis and foreign‐
ers (Simonovits & Szeitl, 2019). Surveys conducted in
the 2010s proved that nationals of the Visegrad Four
strongly dislike ethnic and religious communities, such
as Muslims (commonly identified with “Arabs”), Roma
and Jews. The antipathy to Roma and Muslims has
remained strong since 2002. A surge of anti‐Muslim and
anti‐Arab sentiment has been observed since mid‐2015.
In Poland, antipathy to “Arabs” reached the level of
67% in March 2016 and was maintained in the follow‐
ing years, amounting to 65% in January 2019 (CBOS,
2019, p. 2). Accordingly, most respondents (64%) high‐
lighted intolerance and aggressive features of Islam: 57%
thought that it encourages violence and 51% believed
that Muslims approve violent actions against other reli‐
gions (CBOS, 2015). In the Czech Republic, according to
an opinion poll conducted in March 2017 by the Czech
Public Opinion Research Centre, antipathy to “Arabs”
was declared by 75% of the respondents (Colborne,
2017). This negative attitude decreased slightly later,
reaching in March 2020 the level 66–69% (Centrum pro
výzkum veřejného mínění, 2020). A similar level of nega‐
tive attitudes towards Muslims was displayed in an opin‐
ion poll in Hungary in early 2016: 72% of the respon‐
dents declared an unfavourable view of Muslims in their
country (Manevich, 2016). In Slovakia, this level is slightly
lower: 54% of the respondents to a poll carried out in
December 2017 declared they “did not want to have a
Muslim as a neighbour” (“Čoraz viac Slovákov,” 2017).
The above attitudes reflect the application of some
principles of parochial politics tomigration policy. Nation
and faith were chosen as criteria of belonging and
identity‐shaping with direct reference to indigenisation
and religious exclusionism. The figure of a refugee mis‐
named as an “Arab” and associated with the “alien,” or
the “other,” was inculcated in the public consciousness in
the context of a parochial sense of ontological insecurity.
5. Conclusions
The exclusionary, deterrent approach to immigrants and
refugees arriving in Europe from the beginning of the
2010s was one of the most remarkable features of
European politics at that time. The anti‐immigrant narra‐
tive became a permanent part of everyday communica‐
tion and public discourse. Though not particularly unique
when compared to earlier immigration waves in Europe
or to some EUmember states, the Visegrad Four deserve
a critical assessment regarding the outburst of aversion
and hostility towards migrants coinciding with the denial
of refugees as migrants deserving protection based on
international humanitarian law.
This may be partly explained by ideological factors.
The liberal model was challenged by, and—in the case of
Hungary and Poland—substituted with a specific illiberal
project entailing the restoration of traditionalist patterns
of parochial communities mobilized by the top‐down,
persuasive transmission of a strange blend of nationalist,
xenophobic, anti‐cosmopolitan, anti‐elitist, and conspir‐
atorial views. That project also underlaid the ideological
construction of immigration policy and influenced atti‐
tudes towards migrants and refugees.
Concurrently, it must be pointed out that the values
and norms of European Union politics, especially those
concerning the freedom of movement of persons, were
used selectively to justify and legitimize the Visegrad
Four’s ethnocentric postures via integrationist policies
andmechanismswhich accentuated protectivemeasures
and security imperatives. The parochial realms cultivated
in the Visegrad Four were intimately tied to their terri‐
tories, enhancing therefore the deterrent and repulsive
functions of border, immigration, and asylum policies.
The above analysis has shown that parochial politics
petrifies the traditional cleavages at the supra‐local level,
reinforcing simultaneously the sense of provincial altru‐
ism and hostility towards the others. Discourse and com‐
munication play a critical role in augmenting exclusionary
attitudes and constructing a reversed image of transna‐
tional processes. The use of misnomers has been exem‐
plified by nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric in exclud‐
ing refugees from the humanitarian regime or denigrat‐
ing selected religious or ethnic groups.
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